The Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Unknown Valuations
Contributo in Atti di convegno
Data di Pubblicazione:
2024
Citazione:
The Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Unknown Valuations / N. Cesa Bianchi, T. Cesari, R. Colomboni, F. Fusco, S. Leonardi - In: STOC 2024: Proceedings / [a cura di] B. Mohar, I. Shinkar, R. O'Donnell. - [s.l] : ACM, 2024. - ISBN 979-8-4007-0383-6. - pp. 225-236 (( Intervento presentato al 56. convegno Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing tenutosi a Vancouver nel 2024 [10.1145/3618260.3649658].
Abstract:
We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder
in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers
the item’s value only if the auction is won. Our main contribution
is a complete characterization, up to logarithmic factors, of the
minimax regret in terms of the auction’s transparency, which con-
trols the amount of information on competing bids disclosed by
the auctioneer at the end of each auction. Our results hold under
different assumptions (stochastic, adversarial, and their smoothed
variants) on the environment generating the bidder’s valuations
and competing bids. These minimax rates reveal how the interplay
between transparency and the nature of the environment affects
how fast one can learn to bid optimally in first-price auctions.
Tipologia IRIS:
03 - Contributo in volume
Keywords:
Online Learning; First-Price Auction; Transparency
Elenco autori:
N. Cesa Bianchi, T. Cesari, R. Colomboni, F. Fusco, S. Leonardi
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Link al Full Text:
Titolo del libro:
STOC 2024: Proceedings
Progetto: