Data di Pubblicazione:
2021
Citazione:
Are Counterpossibles Epistemic? / D. Dohrn. - In: PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY. - ISSN 0279-0750. - 102:1(2021 Mar), pp. 51-72. [10.1111/papq.12332]
Abstract:
It has been suggested that intuitions supporting the nonvacuity of counterpossibles can be explained by distinguishing an epistemic and a metaphysical reading of counterfactuals. Such an explanation must answer why we tend to neglect the distinction of the two readings. By way of an answer, I offer a generalized pattern for explaining nonvacuity intuitions by a stand-and-fall relationship to certain indicative conditionals. Then, I present reasons for doubting the proposal: nonvacuists can use the epistemic reading to turn the table against vacuists, telling apart significant from spurious intuitions. Moreover, our intuitions tend to survive even if we clear-headedly intend a metaphysical reading.
Tipologia IRIS:
01 - Articolo su periodico
Elenco autori:
D. Dohrn
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