On Searle’s Derivation and Its Relation to Constitutive Rules: A Social Scientist’s Perspective

The author first distinguishes between evaluative and normative (or ought-)statements. While—not without some qualifications—evaluative statements can be logically derived from is-statements containing evaluative predicates, “parallel” ought-from-is derivations (OFIDs) raise problems. To address these problems, the author distinguishes between OFIDs involving (α) terms like “slave” or “chess rook” and “OFIDs” involving (β) terms like “promise” or “derive.” α-terms serve to express or describe normative emotions, attitudes, and/or hypostatizations; β-terms serve to create them (in a socio-psychological sense). While with α-terms OFIDs are possible, β-terms can be used only to make socio-psychological hypotheses. Next, the author shows that Searle’s counts-as formula selects phenomena unrelated to Searle’s examples of constitutive rules. Finally, the author shows that—pace Searle—language alone does not make OFIDs possible.