Autocratisation by Term Limits Manipulation in Sub-Saharan Africa

Besides the introduction of multi- party elections, the sub- Saharan wave of democratic reforms of the 1990s encompassed the introduction of limits to the number of terms that a chief executive can serve. Executive term limits (ETLs) are key for democracy to advance in a continent with a legacy of personal rule. However, the manipulation of ETLs has become a recurring mode of autocratisation, through which African aspiring over- stayers weaken executive constraints, taint political competition, and limit citi-zens’ possibility to choose who governs. This article presents a three- phase model of autocratisation by ETL manipulation and, using new data, offers one of the first regional comparative studies of ETL manipulation in sub- Saharan Africa that rests on econo-metric modelling. The analysis leads to revisiting some previous findings on the drivers of ETL manipulation and highlights the relevance of other previously underestimated factors that may either discourage a leader from challenging ETLs or prevent their successful manipulation.