Data di Pubblicazione:
2020
Citazione:
Solving the Hi-lo Paradox: Equilibria, Beliefs, and Coordination / F. Guala (STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIALITY). - In: Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency / [a cura di] A. Fiebich. - [s.l] : Springer, 2020. - ISBN 9783030297824. - pp. 149-168 [10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1_9]
Abstract:
Game theorists have tried for decades to explain how rational or quasi-rational individuals are able to coordinate in situations in which there is more than one way to satisfy their preferences. In this chapter I focus in particular on the formation of common beliefs that supposedly sustain coordination in Hi-lo games. I review some attempts to solve the problem, such as bounded rationality, team reasoning, and solution thinking. Following their lead, I suggest that successful coordination is belief-less coordination, and that simple means-ends rationality explains how coordination problems may be solved using techniques of minimal mindreading.
Tipologia IRIS:
03 - Contributo in volume
Keywords:
Coordination; Team reasoning; Solution thinking; Beliefs; Focal point
Elenco autori:
F. Guala
Link alla scheda completa:
Titolo del libro:
Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency