Data di Pubblicazione:
2020
Citazione:
The non-maximality-solution to counterfactual scepticism / D. Dohrn. - In: SYNTHESE. - ISSN 0039-7857. - (2020 Aug 05). [Epub ahead of print] [10.1007/s11229-020-02808-8]
Abstract:
The following semantics for counterfactuals is fairly standard: for a counterfactual
to be true, the closest antecedent worlds have to be consequent worlds. Closeness is
measured by overall similarity of worlds to an evaluation world. There is a range of
interrelated challenges to this account: counterfactual scepticism, ‘Hegel’-, ‘Sobel’-,
and ‘Heim’-sequences. So far there is no unified solution to these challenges. I discuss
a solution that preserves the standard semantics by writing the shifty parameter into
pragmatics. The solution has been suggested by Križ for Sobel- and Heim-sequences,
yet I argue that it can be generalized to counterfactual scepticism. Conditionals are
subject to a pattern which is familiar from descriptions. Everyday counterfactuals are
semantically homogeneous and pragmatically non-maximal. Homogeneity: a counterfactual
is neither true nor false if only some but not all closest antecedent worlds are
consequent worlds. Non-maximality: in many contexts, not all but only practically all
closest antecedent worlds have to be consequent worlds for the utterance of a counterfactual
to say something true if the difference does not matter for the purposes of
conversation.
Tipologia IRIS:
01 - Articolo su periodico
Keywords:
Conditional; Counterfactual; Scepticism; Sobel sequence; If; Subjunctive; Counterfactual scepticism; Modal; Homogeneity; Imprecision; Semantics; Pragmatics
Elenco autori:
D. Dohrn
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