Neuroscience and End-of-Life Decisions: What Kind of Coexistence?

One of the most far-reaching challenges posed to the law by the development of neuroscience is the possibility to unveil some of the interior elements of human beings in the absence of external manifestations. The perception of pain, the presence of consciousness and the wishes of incompetent patients, once unfathomable because they could not be externalized, are nowadays accessible also from persons unable to express themselves (such as infants, people in comas, severely disabled people, etc.). These new frontiers raise an anthropological question and place heavy demands for lawyers embroiled in end-of-life matters, especially for constitutional lawyers. The present paper aims to highlight how the search for a balanced relationship between neuroscientific acquisitions and end-of-life decisions is weakened by at least two risks: the utmost deference towards science and scientific authority and the maximization of self-determination. In view of all this, the paper will provide, at the beginning, a framework of case law and end-of-life regulatory attempts with a specific focus on the recent law on informed consent and living will approved by the Italian Parliament; it will follow the analysis of the main challenges posed to law by advances in neuroscience. In the final part of this paper, we will offer food for thought on the role of neuroscience and—in a broader perspective—of science in law.