Liberalism, Pluralism, and a Third Way

One of the most prominent and long-standing issues in normative political philosophy concerns how democratic societies should deal with the problem of pluralism, which may elicit conflicts and have a dangerous impact on relations between citizens. Within this debate, it is commonplace to hold that a liberal solution to the problem of pluralism cannot start from objectivist premises. Scholars defending the theories of public reason and modus vivendi share the conviction that appeals to some form of objective truth is detrimental to the liberal project, aimed at securing political agreements characterized by inclusiveness for different points of view and a stable society in which individuals can pursue their preferred ends and plans of life. Liberals seem to believe that endorsing an objective understanding of moral truth is dangerous insofar as it can be used as a means to silence pluralism, dissolve diversity, and in the end destroy liberty. In this chapter, such a conviction is challenged by suggesting that a certain understanding of the notion of “principled compromise” constitutes an option for those who are committed to objectivist premises and yet want to secure an agreement that is liberal in kind because it is inclusive and stable.