Data di Pubblicazione:
2019
Citazione:
Counterfactuals versus conceivability as a guide to modal knowledge / D. Dohrn. - In: PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES. - ISSN 0031-8116. - (2019). [Epub ahead of print] [10.1007/s11098-019-01386-x]
Abstract:
I compare two prominent approaches to knowledge of metaphysical modality, the more traditional approach via conceiving viz. imagining a scenario and a more recent approach via counterfactual reasoning. In particular, Timothy Williamson has claimed that the proper context for a modal exercise of imagination is a counterfactual supposition. I critically assess this claim, arguing that a purely conceivability/imaginability-based approach has a key advantage compared to a counterfactual-based one. It can take on board Williamson’s insights about the structure of modal imagination while avoiding aspects of counterfactual reasoning which are orthogonal to figuring out metaphysical modality. In assessing whether A is possible, we creatively devise test scenarios, psychologically and metaphysically apt A-scenarios, which manifest the relevant metaphysical requirements and test them for their compatibility with A. In this exercise, imagination is subject to implicit constraints as Williamson has it, but it is not bound to drawing consequences from minimally altering actuality such as to make room for A.
Tipologia IRIS:
01 - Articolo su periodico
Keywords:
Conceivability; Conceiving; Counterfactual; Imagination; Imagining; Modal; Modal epistemology; Modal knowledge; Necessary; Possible; Williamson
Elenco autori:
D. Dohrn
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