End in Itself, Freedom, and Autonomy: The Place of the Naturrecht Feyerabend in Kant’s Moral Rationalism
Capitolo
Data di Pubblicazione:
2020
Citazione:
End in Itself, Freedom, and Autonomy: The Place of the Naturrecht Feyerabend in Kant’s Moral Rationalism / S. Bacin - In: Kants Naturrecht Feyerabend : Analysen und Perspektiven / [a cura di] M. Ruffing, A. Schlitte, G. Sadun Bordoni. - Berlin : De Gruyter, 2020 Jan. - ISBN 9783110672251. - pp. 91-115 [10.1515/9783110672251-008]
Abstract:
The chapter deals with the two most distinctive elements of the Introduction of the Naturrecht Feyerabend, namely the notions of an end in itself and autonomy. I shall argue that both are to be interpreted with regard to the aim of explaining the ground of right. In this light, I suggest that the notion of an end in itself counters a voluntarist conception like Achenwall’s with a claim whose necessity has a twofold ground: First, the representation of an unconditional worth emerges as a structural element of the practical use of reason. Second, that representation concerns the necessary self-understanding of moral subjects. Finally, I argue that the other distinctive element, the occurrence of the notion of autonomy, is best understood as an application of that idea to a specific issue, which Kant addresses by showing that freedom is a self-regulating domain.
Tipologia IRIS:
03 - Contributo in volume
Elenco autori:
S. Bacin
Link alla scheda completa:
Titolo del libro:
Kants Naturrecht Feyerabend : Analysen und Perspektiven