Data di Pubblicazione:
2019
Citazione:
Possibilistic randomisation in strategic-form games / H. Hosni, E. Marchioni. - In: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF APPROXIMATE REASONING. - ISSN 0888-613X. - 114(2019 Nov), pp. 204-225. [10.1016/j.ijar.2019.08.008]
Abstract:
Since the seminal work of John Nash, convex combinations of actions are known to guarantee the existence of equilibria in strategic-form games. This paper introduces an alternative notion of randomisation among actions – possibilistic randomisation – and investigates the mathematical consequences of doing so. The framework of possibility theory gives rise to two distinct notions of equilibria both of which are characterised in our main results: a qualitative one based on the Sugeno integral and a quantitative one based on the Choquet integral. Then the two notions of equilibrium are compared against a coordination game with payoff-distinguishable equilibria known as the Weak-link game.
Tipologia IRIS:
01 - Articolo su periodico
Keywords:
Mixed strategies; Nash equilibria; Possibilistic expected utility; Possibilistic randomisation; Selection of multiple equilibria; Weak-link game
Elenco autori:
H. Hosni, E. Marchioni
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