Data di Pubblicazione:
2017
Citazione:
Enforcing cooperation in public goods games : Is one punisher enough? / D. Grieco, M. Faillo, L. Zarri. - In: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY. - ISSN 0167-4870. - 61(2017 Aug), pp. 55-73. [10.1016/j.joep.2017.03.007]
Abstract:
We experimentally investigate a finitely repeated public goods game setting where, in each round, access to sanctioning power is exclusively awarded to one single player per group. We show that our central ‘Top Contributors as Punishers’ institution – a mechanism by which a player needs to be the highest contributor in her group in order to earn the right to sanction others – is extremely effective in raising cooperation and welfare due to turnover in the top contributor role and to top contributors’ willingness to substantially sanction others. Our findings yield implications for the design of mechanisms intended to foster cooperation in social dilemma environments.
Tipologia IRIS:
01 - Articolo su periodico
Keywords:
Behavioral mechanism design; Cooperation; Peer punishment; Public goods games; Top contributors; Applied Psychology; Sociology and Political Science; Economics and Econometrics
Elenco autori:
D. Grieco, M. Faillo, L. Zarri
Link alla scheda completa: