Rispetto e giustificazione pubblica da una prospettiva oggettivista

The core of justificatory liberalism relies on the idea that coercion must be justified to all citizens with reasons they can reasonably be expected to accept. Citizens ought to disci-pline themselves in public discourse because respect triggers a duty requiring them to sup-port only those norms that enjoy public justification. In this article, I question the argu-ments justificatory liberals use to defend the link between respect and public justification, both in their consensus and convergence version. I argue that the idea of respect they em-ploy runs against their own premises in being inevitably authoritarian and that the re-quirements of public justification foster some disrespectful attitudes among disagreeing cit-izens. I contend not only that justificatory liberals lack an argument for the idea that to re-spect one person is to provide her with reasons she can accept, but also that the problem concerns a misunderstanding about justification. Although it is correct to think that there is something morally objectionable to coerce another on the basis of one’s beliefs, there is nothing wrong in coercing another because things are such and such (as one believes). I conclude by drawing a distinction between justificatory liberalism and objectivist liberalism and their different conceptions of respect.