ПРОТИВОРЕЧИЯ КАК ЭМПИРИЧЕСКИЕ НЕСОВМЕСТИМОСТИ В ПСИХОЛОГИИ ЭТИЧЕСКИХ ЭМОЦИЙ И В ПРАВОВОЙ (И НЕ ТОЛЬКО) ДОГМАТИКЕ: РАДИКАЛЬНО-ЭМПИРИЧЕСКИЙ ПОДХОД

FITTIPALDI E. CONTRADICTIONS AS EMPIRICAL INCOMPATIBILITIES IN PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICAL EMOTIONS AND (BUT NOT ONLY LEGAL) DOGMATICS: A RADICAL-EMPIRICIST APPROACH Fittipaldi aims at bridging the psychology of ethical emotions and legal-dogmatic thinking in the field of contradictions. To this end Fittipaldi relies on Łukasiewicz and Vasiliev, as well as on classical radical empiricists (Berkeley and Hume). The general legal framework is Petrażyckianism (i.e. the teachings of Petrażycki and his most faithful pupils). Contradiction is defined as a phenomenon occurring when the same individual states that a couple of empirically incompatible events (i.e. a conjunctive empirical incompatibility) are both the case. Fittipaldi brings to conjunctive empirical incompatibilities the following: 1) deontic contrarieties (something obligatory and prohibited at the same time) and deontic contradictions (e.g. something prohibited and permitted at the same time), 2) “validity” contradictions (when, e.g., certain normative act is in force and repealed at the same time). Each of these three phenomena is analyzed from a psychological and from a dogmatic (or an axiomatic) perspective. From a psychological perspective Fittipaldi shows that these phenomena are perfectly possible within some Subject. From a dogmatic (or an axiomatic) perspective, Fittipaldi shows that the Subject may adopt various kinds of axioms (or dogmata) of non-contradiction and these axioms may play a crucial rule in both the healthy child’s growth and in the technical improvement of a legal system.