The epistemology of testimony: reductionism vs antireductionism.

Abstract This dissertation discusses one of the most fundamental issues of the epistemology of testimony, that is, how the hearer ascribes trustworthiness to the speaker’s testimony. For this discussion, I focus on two theories, namely reductionism and anti-reductionism. My discussion is based on justified true belief (JTB) theory of knowledge. However, in the history of Western epistemology, controversy exists regarding the possibility of the JTB theory. Without entering the controversy I accept the definition of Knowledge it provides. In Chapter One and Two, I formulate David Hume’s concept of testimony and then argue that the Humean account of testimony is a type of local reductionism. Some epistemologists contend that Hume’s concept of testimony is a type of global reductionism. However, I reject this view. In Chapter Three, I discuss Elizabeth Fricker’s concept of local reductionism and further argue that there is no disagreement between Hume’s concept of local reductionism and Fricker’s concept of local reductionism. In Chapter Four and Five, I analyse the anti-reductionist account of Tyler Burge and Jennifer Lackey. In particular, I analyse Burge’s apriori defense of anti-reductionism, and Lackey’s formulation of minimal anti-reductionism. Finally, I argue that both reductionism and anti-reductionism emphasize one aspect of epistemology of testimony only. Reductionism tries to explain why the hearer should accept the speaker’s testimony after verification and anti-reductionism explains why the hearer should accept speaker’s testimony without any verification. Yet, both theories are incomplete and I contend that an alternative theory is needed for the epistemology of testimony. I present one alternative theory already present in the literature, namely Lackey’s dualism. After criticizing Lackey’s account, I defend a new theory, which I called contextualism.