No Easy Way Out: Origins of NATO's Difficulties in Afghanistan

North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) engagement in Afghanistan represents the most challenging operation in alliance history. Although after 14 years of international intervention the political and socio-economic conditions in Afghanistan have improved, the ongoing withdrawal of international troops is not leaving the country with clear prospects of stability. A vast literature examines the alliance in Afghanistan. An especially relevant important part deals with the USA and NATO mistakes, lessons learned or assessment of the current situation. The origins of NATO's difficulties in Afghanistan are less systematically explored. The consequences of NATO inheriting an ongoing intervention, what it inherited, and the ultimate implications of the distinction between the ‘American war’ and the allied mission remained partially overlooked and obscure. A comprehensive understanding of the origins of what went wrong in allied involvement in Afghanistan is paramount to making sense of the alliance's role today and in the future. This article examines the origins of what NATO inherited in 2003, particularly in the light of the re-Americanization of the conflict during the Obama administration. This analysis focuses on: the consequences of the initial lack of distinction between the Taliban and al-Qaeda; the problems of coordination and competing visions between Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force; the ideological side of the war on terror which complicated the regional context; and the limited results Obama's strategy achieved. Focusing on the origins of the problems the alliance faces in Afghanistan permits better appreciation of the uniqueness of NATO's intervention and the challenge required to avert the double risk of overestimating or underestimating NATO's actual role in Afghanistan and its implications for the alliance's future.