The Post-national Constellation of Industrial Relations Systems in the European Legal Order

This paper develops a new interpretation of the norms of the Treaty of Lisbon to find the juridical basis for an autonomous system of European industrial relations. In particular, the study explores the question of whether the provisions in EU law (art. 152, 154 and 155 TFEU and art 28 Charter FSR) could constitute a sufficient basis for granting social parties the power to regulate sectors under their competence (such as social policy) through collective bargaining, without the involvement of European institutions. In so doing, the author advances the hypothesis of an extra-institutional system of rule-making, the efficacy of which is measurable over time, depending on the agreement’s degree of propagation, outside of the dual-logic hermeneutic approach (binding vs. non binding). Despite the as yet only embryonic capacity of trade unions to coordinate among themselves, the author gives some examples of the autonomous development of European collective bargaining to support the hypothesis, looking also at the transnational level. In the light of the theoretical framework and autonomous negotiations, the author argues that there is a new mode of normative regulation, made by social partners and aimed at achieving social policy objectives.