Data di Pubblicazione:
2013
Citazione:
Counterfactuals and two kinds of ought / D.H.J. Dohrn - In: Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? : Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der
Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. / [a cura di] M. Hoeltje, T. Spitzley, W. Spohn. - [s.l] : Universität Duisburg-Essen, 2013. - ISBN 9783000423321. - pp. 588-593
Abstract:
I discuss Caspar Hare’s solution to a new variant of Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem. Hare’s solution rests on distinguishing two kinds of ought: The Ought of Omniscient Desire: what you oughtOD to do is what an omniscient, rational creature with appropriate interests would want you to do. The Ought of Most Reason: what you oughtMR to do is what there is most reason to do. I argue that the distinction does not dissolve the problem. Moreover, I show that Hare’s proposal to spell out his distinction in terms of an embedded counterfactual (if you had not done what you did, then, if you had done what you did, what would the consequence have been?) is flawed.
Tipologia IRIS:
03 - Contributo in volume
Elenco autori:
D.H.J. Dohrn
Link alla scheda completa:
Titolo del libro:
Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? : Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der
Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V.
Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V.