»Ein Bewußtsein, das selbst Pflicht ist«: Fichtes unkantische Auffassung des Gewissens und ihr philosophischer Kontext
Capitolo
Data di Pubblicazione:
2017
Citazione:
»Ein Bewußtsein, das selbst Pflicht ist«: Fichtes unkantische Auffassung des Gewissens und ihr philosophischer Kontext / S. Bacin (FICHTE-STUDIEN). - In: Fichte und seine Zeit: Streitfragen / [a cura di] M.V. d'Alfonso, C. De Pascale, E. Fuchs, M. Ivaldo. - [s.l] : Brill, 2017. - ISBN 9789004336667. - pp. 306-325 [10.1163/9789004336674_021]
Abstract:
Aim of the paper is contributing to a context-informed understanding of Fichte’s theory of conscience. This crucial element in his moral philosophy (and, in fact, in his whole philosophy) represents the last of the many significant accounts of conscience in the 18th century, before in the following century the role of conscience in moral life was repeatedly put into question. Accordingly, in my paper I argue that: (1) Fichte puts forward an un-Kantian account of conscience, following, instead, a quite different model; (2) Fichte’s views on conscience grew out of a complex conceptual milieu, from which Fichte borrows important (quasi-)sentimentalist elements; (3) Fichte’s idea of the infallibility of conscience must be distinguished from other similar views put forward in the same years.
Tipologia IRIS:
03 - Contributo in volume
Keywords:
conscience; moral knowledge; moral particularism
Elenco autori:
S. Bacin
Link alla scheda completa:
Titolo del libro:
Fichte und seine Zeit: Streitfragen