Data di Pubblicazione:
2013
Citazione:
ESSAYS ON FORWARD-LOOKING BEHAVIOR IN STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS / M. Mantovani ; supervisore: Antonio Filippin, Georg Kirchsteiger. UNIVERSITA' DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO, 2013 May 09. 24. ciclo, Anno Accademico 2011. [10.13130/mantovani-marco_phd2013-05-09].
Abstract:
The general topic of our thesis is forward looking behavior in strategic situations.
Mixing theoretical and experimental analysis, we document how strategic thinking
is affected by the specific features of a dynamic interaction. The overarching result
is that the information regarding decisions that are close to the current one, receive
a qualitatively different consideration, with respect to distant ones. That is, the
actual decisions are based on reasoning over a limited number of steps, close to
actual decison node. We capture this feature of behavior both in a strategic (limited
backward induction) and in a non-strategic (limited farsightedness) set up, and we
identify relevant consequences on the outcome of the interaction, which powerfullly
explain many observed experimental regularities.
Tipologia IRIS:
Tesi di dottorato
Keywords:
Behavioral game theory ; bounded rationality ; sequential games ;
strategic thinking ; level-k; backward induction ; representation effects race game ; centipede game ; network formation ; experiment ; pairwise stability ; farsighted stability
Elenco autori:
M. Mantovani
Link alla scheda completa:
Link al Full Text: