Coarse Correlated Equilibria in Linear Quadratic Mean Field Games and Application to an Emission Abatement Game

Coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) are a good alternative to Nash equilibria (NE), as they arise more naturally as outcomes of learning algorithms and as they may exhibit higher payoffs than NE. CCEs include a device which allows players’ strategies to be correlated without any cooperation, only through information sent by a mediator. We develop a methodology to concretely compute mean field CCEs in a linear-quadratic mean field game (MFG) framework. We compare their performance to mean field control solutions and mean field NE (usually named MFG solutions). Our approach is implemented in the mean field version of an emission abatement game between greenhouse gas emitters. In particular, we exhibit a simple and tractable class of mean field CCEs which allows to outperform very significantly the mean field NE payoff and abatement levels, bridging the gap between the mean field NE and the social optimum obtained by mean field control.