Conspiracy beliefs and monothematic delusions: a case for de-pathologizing

Monothematic delusions and beliefs in conspiracy theories share some important features: they both typically have bizarre contents and are resistant to counterevidence. Yet conspiracy beliefs are generally taken to be a normal range phenomenon, whilst monothematic delusions are considered to involve doxastic pathology. In this paper, we argue that this difference in conceptualization is not warranted, and that, if we’re right, the correct response is to de-pathologize monothematic delusions. We identify three reasons which could justify taking monothematic delusions to be pathological beliefs whilst not treating conspiracy beliefs in such terms. First, we consider what have been identified as initial provoking conditions in monothematic delusions (anomalous experience) and conspiracy beliefs (epistemic mistrust). Second, we consider the role of cognitive biases or deficits in these phenomena. Third, we consider the different roles played by testimony and one’s social environment in the formation and maintenance of monothematic delusions and conspiracy beliefs. We argue that there are no grounds from any of these quarters for the different approaches taken with respect to the question of doxastic pathology. Our primary conclusion then is that monothematic delusions and conspiracy beliefs should be treated the same in this respect. Our secondary conclusion is that the correct way to do so is to de-pathologize monothematic delusions.