Data di Pubblicazione:
2011
Citazione:
Government Alternation and Legislative Agenda Setting / F. Zucchini. - In: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH. - ISSN 0304-4130. - 50:6(2011 Dec), pp. 749-774. [10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01983.x]
Abstract:
Recent studies of the legislative process have put forward a number of plausible
hypotheses regarding the distribution of agenda-setting power. These hypotheses have
guided scholars in identifying those conflicts and actors that are crucial to explaining legislative
change and the wording of legislation. However, this has not yet led to a better
understanding of the choice of specific agenda-setting rules.Why does the cabinet in some
parliamentary democracies enjoy an undisputed role, while in others the parliament continues
to play the role of co-protagonist? This article attempts to answer this question by
looking at some well-known features of party systems. It is argued that in pivotal party
systems, with limited government alternation, it is much more difficult to strengthen the
government vis-à-vis the parliament. One factor prevents the procedural and institutional
predominance of the cabinet under these circumstances: the lack of opportunities for, and
expectations of, large and controversial policy change.
Tipologia IRIS:
01 - Articolo su periodico
Keywords:
lawmaking; agenda-setting power; alternation; Italy
Elenco autori:
F. Zucchini
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