Data di Pubblicazione:
2012
Citazione:
Modals vs. Morals : Supervenience and Conceptual Relativity / D.H.J. Dohrn - In: Nachdenken und Vordenken : Herausforderungen an die Philosophie / [a cura di] O. Petersen, D. Borchers, T. Spitzley, M. Stöckler. - [s.l] : Universität Duisburg-Essen, 2012. - ISBN 9783000364402. - pp. 645-666 (( convegno GAP.7.
Abstract:
In order to critically scrutinize the well-known modal argument Simon Blackburn forwards against moral realism, I propose to distinguish weak and strong conceptual relativism: In contrast to the former, the latter takes into account all natural facts. Given the former, I want to show how moral realism can solve Blackburn’s problem while projectivism as endorsed by Blackburn cannot. Given the latter, I firstly attempt a consistent formulation of Blackburn’s challenge. Secondly, I argue that Blackburn’s version of projectivism cannot adequately deal with it. Thirdly, I uncover general difficulties for moral realism resulting from moral relativism.
Tipologia IRIS:
03 - Contributo in volume
Elenco autori:
D.H.J. Dohrn
Link alla scheda completa:
Titolo del libro:
Nachdenken und Vordenken : Herausforderungen an die Philosophie