Data di Pubblicazione:
2012
Citazione:
Bounded oligarchy : how and when factions constrain leaders in party
position-taking / A. Ceron. - In: ELECTORAL STUDIES. - ISSN 0261-3794. - 31:4(2012), pp. 689-701. [10.1016/j.electstud.2012.07.004]
Abstract:
This work investigates the process of position-taking, focussing on the factional bargaining
within the party. Exploiting two recently built datasets that estimated the policy positions
of Italian parties and factions from 1946 to 2010, we investigate if and to what extent
factions bind the party leader in choosing the platform. We find confirmation for the idea
that party positions are linked to factional preferences. Overall, the party works as
a ‘bounded oligarchy’. Furthermore, the electoral payoff of party unity increases the impact
of factional constraints when general elections approach. In line with the cartel party
theory, however, autonomous leaders who are directly elected by a wider selectorate can
get rid of factional ties choosing more moderate and vote-maximizing platforms
Tipologia IRIS:
01 - Articolo su periodico
Keywords:
Cartel party; Content analysis; Downs; Factions; Italy; Party position taking
Elenco autori:
A. Ceron
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